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ABSTRACT
Music in the Digital Age: An Analysis of Declining Revenue in the U.S. Recorded Music
Industry
Ward M. Reesman
Director: Dr. Michael Allgrunn, Ph.D.

At its height, the U.S. recorded music industry brought in annual revenue of $20
billion. Since the turn of the 21st century, there has been a dramatic decline in recorded
music revenue, to a level of $7.6 billion in 2016. What has been the cause of this sharp
decline? In this paper, I hypothesize that technological advancement and the rise of
music piracy via file-sharing technologies have been the primary instruments of this
decline. I find empirical evidence that technological advancement is associated with
downward pressure on recorded music revenue but find ambiguous results to the impact
of music piracy. I reconcile these findings with a summary of a growing expanse of
literature that suggests on net, music piracy has a negative impact on aggregate recorded
music revenue, though the literature is inconclusive as to the magnitude of this effect. I
conclude with suggestions of future research directions to determine the full effects of
digitization on musician and consumer welfare.

Keywords: music industry, recorded music revenue, economics, piracy, file sharing,
technology
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I.

Introduction
The U.S. recorded music industry brought in $20 billion dollars of revenue per

year at its height. However, since its peak in the year 1999, revenue has been drastically
declining, with total recorded music revenue around $7 billion in the year 2016. While
revenue has declined, total units of recorded music sold have increased dramatically from
2004 to 2016. Basic economic theory intuits the price of music must be decreasing—
higher quantities sold with lower revenues is consistent with lower prices per unit being
offered in the market. Figure 1 illustrates revenue data as obtained from the Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA) over the timespan 1973 to 2016, while Figure 2
illustrates unit sales over the same time. Each shade is representative of a different type
of medium through which recorded music can be obtained by the consumer. Figure 3
depicts a rudimentary calculation of the average price of a unit of recorded music found
by dividing total revenue in each year by respective unit sales. These figures provide a
visual for the general underpinnings of this paper.
Key events and developments in the recorded music industry are denoted on the
figures. Napster, LimeWire, and PirateBay are online peer-to-peer file sharing networks
that facilitate the unauthorized transfer of copyrighted files, or piracy. The release of
Apple, Inc.’s iPod mobile music device and iTunes digital distribution platform occurred
in the early 2000s which were both important technological improvements that increased
the ease of accessing music. These developments will be discussed in detail in a later
section through the development of a proxying method.
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The legal developments labeled on the figures refer to two lawsuits brought
against the five major record label grounds and music retailers in 2000 by 40 states and
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) which charged the organizations with conspiracy to
fix CD prices. The suits were supported by an FTC investigation that estimated price
fixing practices cost consumers more than $480 million. In May 2000, the FTC settled
their suit with decrees requiring the defendants to cease use of policies that required
stores to advertise CDs at or above a set price in return for promotional funding (MTV
News Staff 2000). In 2002, the record labels and retailers settled the federal suit,
agreeing to refund $67.4 million to consumers who purchased CDs from 1995 to 2000
and donate 5.5 million CDs, valued at $75.7 million, to state organizations to be
distributed to schools, libraries, and other nonprofit groups (Deutsch 2002). Further, in
2003, the RIAA filed 261 lawsuits against individuals who had each distributed an
average of more than 1,000 copyrighted music files via online file-sharing networks, in
addition to several other lawsuits against suspected music pirates (La Monica 2003).
These legal events could have had a material impact on recorded music revenue, sales,
and piracy of music products; as such, have been denoted on Figures 1 through 3 for ease
of reference.
While the initial conclusion of falling prices in the last 15 years can be derived
from Figure 3, it is flawed as the distribution of mediums apparent in Figures 1 and 2
complicates the narrative and provides a basis for econometric modeling and analysis.
As can be observed from the color-coded keys, the landscape of the music industry has
changed significantly not only since the turn of the century, but also since recorded music
mediums and sales were first tracked and categorized by the RIAA starting in 1973. This
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shifting landscape has been amplified by rapid technological progress which now allows
consumers to easily access a wide variety of databases containing hundreds of thousands
of music audio files.
In addition, technology has exponentially increased the ease of piracy. Piracy
occurs when copyrighted files are shared between individuals, sometimes distributed
widely, from those who may have legally purchased the good to those who have not paid
for the good in the recorded music market. Generally, piracy is a colloquial term for
copyright infringement, which is the violation of copyright law. Copyright grants
exclusive rights to creators of original works (17 U.S.C. §§ 102-106, 2016). When
copyright is violated, the owner of the exclusive rights can pursue legal action: typically,
through remedies in civil court; however, criminal charges may be filed if the
infringement was committed for private financial gain or with the goal of reproducing or
distributing the infringed material (17 U.S.C. §§ 501-506, 2016).
In this paper, I investigate the impact that technological advancement has had on
revenue in the recorded music industry. As observed in Figures 1 and 2, the landscape of
the industry is rapidly changing in the face of technology and this paper is an inquiry into
the relationship between technological advancement and recorded music revenue. In
addition, I attempt to model the effects of music piracy and file sharing on recorded
music revenue, an illegal activity amplified by the Internet. In a report conducted by the
Institute for Policy Innovation advertised on the RIAA website, the economic losses to
the sound recording industry are estimated to be $5.33 billion, losses to U.S. worker
earnings are estimated to be $2.7 billion, and lost tax revenue to U.S. federal, state, and
local governments is estimated to be at least $422 million (Siwek 2007). Thus, the
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impact of piracy is claimed to be substantial and warrants econometric investigation.
Finally, I test the specific effect that digital music mediums have on total revenue in the
industry.
I find that technological innovation has had downward pressure on revenue in the
recorded music industry but find ambiguous results from piracy and file sharing in my
empirical analysis. Additionally, I find that the shift from physical music mediums to
digital music mediums is associated with downward pressure on the price of music,
representing the idea that digital mediums carry a lower price than physical mediums and
supporting the trend displayed in Figure 3. The remainder of the paper proceeds as
follows: Section 2 reviews the existing theoretical and empirical literature on piracy and
recorded music sales and revenue. Section 3 outlines the research design and
methodology as well as reviews the data used. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis
and discusses the results. Section 5 offers a summary and concluding remarks.
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II.

Review of Related Literature
The impact of piracy and file sharing on recorded music is a difficult

measurement to make, given the sparse availability of data depicting illegal music
transactions. File-sharing networks rarely share downloading data, and it is impractical
and perhaps impossible to accurately measure piracy conducted in offline markets. As
such, estimating the effects of piracy on recorded music sales and revenue is a tricky task
that requires a solid theoretical base and statistical finesse. Luckily, there exists a
sizeable body of work focused on tackling the challenge of estimating piracy’s impact on
the recorded music industry. Here I will review the existing theoretical and empirical
literature concerning this topic to determine what effects other economists have both
postulated and found empirical support for. First, I will examine the theoretical
component elements of piracy. In the following subsection, I will summarize a growing
expanse of empirical work to determine if a consensus exists regarding the magnitude
and direction of piracy’s effect on recorded music sales and revenue.

A. Theoretical Considerations
Hui and Png (2003) document two distinct positive influences of legitimate music
demand by piracy. The first is the potential of demand-side influences. Some individuals
simply like to consume the same item as others, and thus the quantity demanded by a
typical consumer is positively related to quantities demanded by other consumers (Becker
1991). Thus, consumers of music may benefit from indirect or direct network
externalities through the consumption of music. A network externality exists if consumer
utility for a product increases as the number of users grow (Conner & Rumelt 1991). In
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the case of software usage, as Conner and Rumelt (1991) investigate, the more users who
use a software program, the more useful it becomes on a wider scale. A good example of
this phenomenon would be the widespread domination of word processing software by
Microsoft Word—life is easier trading text files if all parties involved are using the same
processing program. In the case of recorded music, it is unlikely network externalities
are factors of ease-of-use as in software, and shared value is likely the primary driver.
The second major positive influence suggested by Hui and Png are supply-side effects
that benefit the legitimate producer. These largely take the form of a concept known as
indirect appropriability, which is discussed later. Hui and Png also note the possibility of
sampling effects, which is also discussed later.
Liebowitz (2005, 2006) echoes the necessity of derivation of shared value for
network effects to exist. Theoretically, file sharing is likely to increase the number of
music listeners as the practice provides access to those unwilling to pay for the legitimate
good. With more listeners of music, the value of music for all individuals, regardless of
whether they consume legally or illegal, would rise and those who consume legally
would purchase more music. Thus, for network effects to promote increased sales of
music, all consumers must derive value from the consumption of music by others. If this
connection is severed, the network effects are lost and those music files that are obtained
illegally will have no impact on the demand for music files by legitimate consumers.
Additionally, Liebowitz argues, there exists ambiguity in the effect of possible network
externalities when isolating global effects from local effects. If shared value drives these
effects, it is likely local network effects, as in exchanges between colleagues, friends, and
family, may drive the brunt of any possible demand-side influence. Any global network
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effects are likely already observable through radio play of music recordings. Finally, it
remains to be examined if network effects have the impact of shifting output between
existing music goods or the impact of changing the overall size of the market by driving
demand for new recorded music.
Besides network externalities, the other predominant positive demand-side
influence of piracy on music sales seen in the literature is known as the sampling effect.
The sampling effect is widely discussed (Liebowitz 2005, 2006; Hui & Png 2003,
Waldfogel 2012; Peitz & Waelbroeck 2004; Gopal et al. 2006; Oberholzer-Gee &
Strumpf 2007; Lee 2018) and it can be described theoretically as follows. Music is an
experience good, that is, the consumer does not have accurate information on the quality
of the good before purchasing it. A consumer does not know the true value of the music
recording until after the initial consumption of the recording. As such, there is an
inherent amount of risk in the decision to purchase a music recording due to the
uncertainty in the product’s value, and this risk may prevent some risk averse consumers
from purchasing the good, even those with a higher willingness to pay relative to the
market price that would receive consumer surplus from consumption. Additionally, some
consumers may purchase the good and be unsatisfied with the value after the initial
consumption. Thus, the condition of asymmetric information prevents standard utility
maximization. However, with the introduction of piracy to the model, a consumer may
now sample the music recording for a much lower cost by downloading it illegally off a
file-sharing network. Now being able to sample at a cost of essentially zero, the
consumer could determine the value of the good prior to purchase and decide with
symmetric information, resulting in utility maximization and an efficient market
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outcome. This theoretical framework is tested in several empirical studies documented in
the following subsection.
Sampling may also benefit music demand through interactions with network
effects. An individual that samples a music product may relay the information gained
through sampling to social connections. If those social connections are consumptionmarginal, the new information presented may elicit consumption that may not have
otherwise occurred. This effect may disseminate through the social networks of each
consumer, and the information obtained from the one instance of sampling may result in
widespread consumption by consumption-marginal agents that may not have consumed
the music product when it first became available (Lee 2018). Thus, the sampling effect
and network externalities may be interrelated. There exists some empirical evidence
investigating this theoretical claim, which will be discussed later.
An element that may alter the effect of sampling via file sharing on legitimate
music sales takes the form of the superstar phenomenon. The superstar effect discusses
how a superstar, i.e. an extremely popular individual in the field, may owe his or her
status to a combination of intrinsic elements of talent, extrinsic elements of circumstance
(luck), and user expectations derived from past performance (Rosen 1981). These
elements work in conjunction with a general desire by consumers to minimize the search
and sampling costs that are necessary to overcome the challenges created by asymmetric
information (Alder 1985). Thus, the difficulty to judge the value of music created by
relatively unknown artists and the statistical tendency of consumers to correlate past
performance with future outcomes lead to a few superstars dominating the market, as the
existing knowledge of those prominent artists reduces sampling costs (MacDonald 1988).
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However, by reducing sampling costs effectively to zero through the introduction of
piracy to the model, we may observe changes to the superstar effect. This is tangentially
discussed in the empirical literature.
Besides network externalities and the sampling effect, a third, less welldocumented positive influence has been discussed theoretically. This is the impact of
indirect appropriability. This concept was first developed in Liebowitz (1985) regarding
effects first observed in the copying of academic journals. The idea is that an increase in
demand might be observed for the originals from which copies are made as those making
the copies capture some of the value from those receiving the copies and in turn transfer
this value into their demand for the originals they purchase. However, for this theory to
work, the variability in the number of copies must be small, or the seller must be able to
distinguish which original products are primarily being used for copies. Liebowitz
examines this effect as it applies to academic journals, hypothesizing that the most
photocopied copyrighted materials are journals and the heaviest photocopying of journals
takes place in libraries. Thus, publishers can charge libraries higher prices than they
charge individual subscribers, anticipating those journals sent to libraries will be copied,
to indirectly capture value from the photocopying. Liebowitz finds empirical support for
this hypothesis, but the same likely cannot be said about indirect appropriability as it
applies to music file sharing. This is because there is a great variability in the quality of
copies made from original music files and it is extremely difficult for sellers of original
music to identify which original recordings will be pirated in order to price discriminate.
Empirical work has yet to test the effects of indirect appropriability as it applies to file

12

sharing, so it is not clear whether the effect exists in the real world or has a positive
impact demand for recorded music.
Thus far, we have outlined three major theoretical considerations that suggest
piracy has positive influences on demand in the legitimate recorded music market. As for
theoretical considerations that suggest piracy has negative influences on revenues in the
legitimate recorded music market, there exists one: the substitution effect, which is
widely considered the traditional or conventional view of piracy (Lee 2018). The
substitution effect is simple in theory and generally easy to analyze. The copy is treated
as a direct substitute of the original, and the consumer faces a decision to either obtain the
music product legitimately as an original product or obtain a copied version via a filesharing network. The copied product may carry costs with it, namely quality differentials
and the actual cost of making or obtaining the copy. If the quality of the copy is identical
or close in quality to the original product, and the cost to make or obtain the copy is low,
the copy has a price of zero (Liebowitz 2005). Compared to the price of the original
music product, a rational consumer will choose the good with a price of zero to maximize
utility. Further, the consumer will have no incentive to purchase the original once they
have obtained the copied product which carries a positive price, as suggested in the
sampling theory, because they have obtained an identical or close-to-identical product for
a price of zero. This effect is most appropriately modeled as a decrease in demand and
will thus reduce the quantity sold and price of the good in the legal market, driving
revenues down. Empirical evidence analyzing the substitution effect both independently
and with respect to potential positive influences is numerous, so I will turn to a discussion
of empirical considerations next to understand which of these effects have been found to
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dominate in determining the impact piracy has on revenue and sales in the recorded
music industry.

B. Empirical Considerations
The empirical literature concerning file sharing and its impact on revenue and
sales in the music industry has struggled to come to a consensus on which theoretical
framework dominates in the real recorded music market, i.e. whether positive influences
outweigh the negative effect of direct substitution. Previous meta-analyses of existing
research have come to varying conclusions. Liebowitz (2005, 2006) finds the overall
effect is overwhelmingly negative. Other authors find no consensus in the literature
(Connolly & Krueger 2006). Deejan (2009) suggests negative empirical impacts have
been overestimated and piracy may be beneficial for unknown artists, and OberholzerGee and Strumpf (2010) conclude file sharing has had a negligible impact on creative
industries and find no reason to believe file sharing has had a negative impact on supply
of music. There is, therefore, a wide range of conclusions about piracy and recorded
music demand. Here, I will conduct a review of my own to see if a similar trend emerges
from analysis of a wide-ranging selection of work done in the field.
One of the earliest empirical pieces investigating piracy was conducted by Hui
and Png (2003). The authors present theoretical models of end-user and re-seller piracy
to account for a variety of market factors and then apply the models to international panel
data of sales volume and an instrument for price for CDs for the period 1994-1998.
Considering the general difficulty of quantitatively measuring piracy and the
consideration that pirated quantity, derivable from International Federation of the
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Phonographic Industry (IFPI) national piracy rates, is endogenously determined in the
model, the authors develop instrumental variables for CD piracy. Two groups of
instruments are used: piracy rates of the closely related information products music
cassettes and business computer software, and total consumer expenditures and
unemployment rates. The rationale for the related piracy rates is that the piracy of those
products and that of CDs might be motivated by the same environmental factors, and the
rationale for expenditures and unemployment concerns the alteration of reservation
utility, a component of the model, via exogenous factors. Using two-stage least squares,
the authors find that the coefficient of piracy was negative and marginally significant.
On a per-capita basis, a one-unit increase in music CD piracy was associated with a
reduction in demand for legitimate music CDs by 0.42 units. Expanding this effect out,
they find that the aggregate recorded music industry lost approximately 6.6% of sales to
piracy in 1998, assuming prices were not adjusted. They note this figure is 42% less than
the figure claimed by the IFPI, suggesting industry organizations are overstating the
effects of piracy.
Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004) attempt to add to the empirical literature with their
own cross-sectional analysis of U.S. CD sales in the period 2000-2001. Using the
percentage of adult Internet users who downloaded music files in MP3 format from the
Internet at least once as a proxy variable for piracy, the authors use a difference-indifferences approach to estimate a significant negative impact of piracy on CD sales.
They state that MP3 downloads can even fully account for the decline of CD sales in the
U.S. market in 2001, depending on the factor of substitutability between MP3s and CDs
and the multiplier effect of offline piracy. Peitz and Waelbroeck therefore document a
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similar negative effect as Hui and Png, although with far different magnitudes, both using
macro-level data and proxies for piracy.
Blackburn (2004) takes a different approach to the problem, identifying the strong
possibility that effects of file sharing on sales of recorded music are unlikely to be
consistent across artists and incorporating this observation into his analysis. In particular,
he notes that the effect of file sharing depends on the ex-ante popularity of the artist in
question. Those artists initially unknown can benefit from increased awareness via the
earlier-discussed network effect, while ex-ante well-known artists are more likely to lose
sales to downloads as they generally already have an established consumer base.
Blackburn applies a theoretical analysis including this new effect, which he dubs as the
awareness effect, to album-level sales and file-sharing network download data over a
period of 62 weeks in 2002 and 2003, including an artist popularity index developed from
Billboard’s Hot 200.
Using two-stage least squares regression and using RIAA legal action as an
exogenous file sharing risk shock, Blackburn finds on an aggregate level file sharing has
had approximately zero effect on sales, a surprising finding but one the author regards as
naïve and incorrect for a variety of reasons. After interacting ex-ante popularity with file
sharing downloads and accounting for album competition effects, he finds that ex-ante
unknown artists are likely to see positive effects on sales from file sharing opposed to exante popular artists, who likely see negative effects on sales from file sharing. This
analysis suggests that on aggregate, considering ex-ante popular artists generally have
significantly more sales than ex-ante unknown artists, file sharing has large, negative
impacts on industry sales.
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Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) offer the most convincing argument that file
sharing has had negligible impact on sales through an analysis that has garnered
widespread attention for its surprising results. The authors use similarly granular data as
Blackburn (2004), observing sales and file-sharing downloads at the album level. The
authors instrument album downloads to account for unobserved album-level
heterogeneity, such as popularity, that is correlated with both file sharing and sales, thus
providing a source of bias to the estimator of interest. The primary instrument used is the
number of German secondary school kids on vacation in a given week, as the authors find
an exogenous variation in file sharing strongly associated with school holidays (kids on
holiday stay at home, where most file sharing takes place, and are typically up later at
night which allows them to engage in file sharing at peak U.S. hours). The full
instrument of downloads includes the holiday instrument in addition to several
interactions between school vacations and album-specific characteristics to account for
heterogeneity among albums and the way they are downloaded.
The authors find that without the instrument, an ordinary least squares estimation
of their model shows file sharing has a small positive effect on record sales. After
instrumenting for downloads in a two-stage least squares regression, the estimated effect
of file sharing on sales is practically small and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Re-specifications and robustness checks support the validity of their model. OberholzerGee and Strumpf thus find no evidence to claim the decline in recorded music sales from
2000 to 2002 was primarily due to file sharing, stating that “while downloads occur on a
vast scale, most users are likely individuals who in the absence of file sharing would not
have bought the music they downloaded” (2007).
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Rob and Waldfogel (2006) analyze the effects of file sharing using survey data
collected from 500 college students across four campuses, similar to Zentner (2006) who
uses European individual-level survey data to develop measures of Internet sophistication
and access to broadband as instruments for file sharing downloads. Zentner finds that
downloads may explain a 30 percent reduction in the probability of buying music and
suggests a back-of-the-envelope calculation, assuming an identical propensity to consume
music between downloaders and non-downloaders, that without downloads sales in 2002
would have been 7.8 percent higher. Rob and Waldfogel find that an additional album
download is associated with a decrease in album purchases by 0.2 in their sample, and
conclude this incomplete sales displacement is supported by the finding that downloaded
music is valued much less than purchased music. In a welfare analysis of a subsample,
the authors find that while downloading reduces expenditures on hit albums by $25 per
capita, it raises consumers’ welfare associated with the albums by $70 per capita. They
find most of this welfare gain of $45 per capita comes from reductions in deadweight loss
created by copyright law.
More recent empirical analyses build off this fundamental literature. Liebowitz
(2008) empirically examines the extent to which file sharing has caused declines in U.S.
recorded music sales using a data set of album sales, Internet penetration, and
demographics from 99 American cities from 1998 to 2003. He finds using Internet
penetration, i.e. number of Internet users, as a proxy for file sharing and assuming
constant average file sharing propensity across the population that a first-differences
regression estimates a large, statistically significant, negative coefficient on the file
sharing proxy. Liebowitz finds the estimate of the reduction in sales due to file sharing,
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after netting out other generic entertainment impacts of the Internet on record sales, to be
larger than the actual measured decline in record sales over the period. This supports the
claim that without Internet downloading in the period 1998-2003, there would have been
an increase in record sales close to the historical industry average.
Hong (2013) applies a difference-in-differences approach to data covering a
similar period as Liebowitz (2008) from the Consumer Expenditure Survey by the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics to determine the effect of file sharing, primarily from Napster,
on recorded music sales. Hong takes care to address changes in the composition of
Internet users as he examines the relationship between household recorded music
expenditures and household propensity to adopt the Internet to determine the effects of
file sharing in examining the type of natural experiment that the existence of Napster
provides. The author finds that file sharing can account for about 20% in the sales
decline in recorded music during the Napster period, that is, 1999-2001. This effect,
while negative, bears a magnitude consistent with some of the empirical literature
covering this timeframe and inconsistent with other studies over the same period.
With album-level data and download data from an anonymous private file-sharing
network, Hammond (2014) examines the effect of file sharing on album sales, exploiting
an exogenous variability in the availability of file-sharing data prior to the legitimate
release of an album, known as a “leak” in the industry. The main research question
Hammond investigates is whether an artist should expect legitimate sales to decline given
wider pre-release availability of the album in file-sharing networks due to the occurrence
of a leak. His findings indicate the answer is no, and generally, file sharing is not
harmful to individual artists. However, Hammond points out to beware of the fallacy of
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composition, as this individual-level finding does not necessarily mean file sharing is not
harmful to the aggregate industry. Additionally, this study finds file sharing has
benefited established artists, but not newer, more unknown artists and file sharing trends
mirror the retail market rather than provide a platform for unknown artists to benefit from
network effects. This is a finding contrary to Blackburn (2004) and also Lee (2018).
Lee (2018) examines a panel dataset of private file-sharing network downloads
and U.S. sales for 2,109 albums during 2008, controlling for artist popularity as
Blackburn (2004) noted the importance of. Lee finds evidence that private-network
sharing results in decreased album purchases, with a larger effect for digital mediums
than physical mediums. Additionally, Lee finds that the effects vary significantly for
artists of different quality and popularity. Exogenous increases in file sharing result in
top-tier artists’ sales decreasing, while the same exogenous effect increases album sales
for mid-tier artists. These findings suggest the substitution effect dominates for more
established artists, while the sampling effect paired with network externalities (dubbed
“word-of-mouth effect” by Lee) seems to prevail in the case of less popular artists who
can benefit from increased exposure as sampled information travels through social
connections and contributes to building a larger fan base. DiCola (2013) provides survey
information that offers supplemental evidence to this claim. In a survey of roughly 5,000
musicians on how they earn most of their revenue, DiCola found on average, musicians
earned 12 percent of their revenue from sources directly related to copyright (sound
recordings), 10 percent from sources with a mixed relationship to copyright (such as
studio sessions), and 78 percent from sources indirectly related or unrelated to copyright.
However, for the top income bracket of musicians, 68 percent of revenue was directly
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related to copyright, 17 percent held a mixed relationship, and 15 percent was indirectly
related or unrelated. File sharing is an activity that mainly harms copyright-focused
revenue, so it is not surprising after examining these survey results that top-tier artists in
the top income bracket of musicians face the largest negative impacts due to file sharing.
Meanwhile, lower-tier artists make much less of their income base from copyrighted
sources, and as such, the sampling and network effects seem to outweigh the substitution
effect.
In the mid-2000s, data became available from Apple’s iTunes online music store,
which provided a useful tool to examine the impact of digital distribution mediums on
file sharing with granular album sales data. Waldfogel (2010) examines survey data of
college students focused on this emerging digital distribution medium. He finds that the
level of file sharing still exceeds the level of purchased music, and the rate of sales
displacement is roughly equivalent to the displacement rate estimated in the period prior
to the availability of iTunes. This finding suggests that legal means of digital distribution
have little impact on stemming illegal file sharing. Danaher et al. (2012) applies a
difference-in-difference approach on iTunes data to examine the impact of the passage of
French anti-piracy law HADOPI, finding that increased consumer awareness of antipiracy measures caused iTunes song and album sales to increase 22.5 percent and 25
percent relative to changes in an international control group. Additionally, the authors
find observed sales increase is much higher in genres that were generally pirated more
prior to the law implementation than genres that experienced less piracy, making a strong
case for well-formed anti-piracy laws in combating file sharing.
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Since 1996, concert ticket prices have vastly outpaced inflation. Krueger
investigates this trend, suggesting a variety of theories from the superstar effect to
cartelization in the recorded music industry as possible causes. He settles on “The Bowie
Theory” as the most likely cause, which he defines as “the technology-induced erosion of
the complementarity between record sales and concert tickets” (2005). As file sharing
has grown, so have concert ticket prices as technology and file sharing have resulted in
decreased revenues from recorded music and musicians must now obtain more of their
income from live performances. Mortimer et al. (2010) apply empirical analysis to this
inquiry and find evidence to support this conclusion. As file sharing and illegal
redistribution of digital music products has increased in volume and negatively impacted
associated revenue, musicians must find sources for income elsewhere which we can
observe in increasing revenue from non-digital complementary products such as live
performances. These findings suggest real harm caused by file sharing and a concerted
effort by musicians to recover lost income from alternative sources.
Further empirical studies examine changes in supply of music and quality of
music, extending beyond the typical focus on demand for legitimate recorded music.
Waldfogel (2011) finds from an empirical analysis of chart-topping albums since the
1960s that there has been no statistically meaningful difference in the tendency for new
artists to appear on Pitchfork Media’s best-of album lists since Napster. While the
process of music discovery and distribution has changed significantly by the Internet and
file-sharing technologies, and demand for legitimate music has arguably declined in the
face of piracy, it appears the supply of new music has not changed significantly at all.
Perhaps a heightened role of complements helps musicians keep a steady flow of income
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in the face of reduced recorded music revenue, or perhaps cost reductions have allowed
the supply of new music to remain steady. Another possibility for this lack of supply
change is that quality is decreasing. However, Waldfogel (2012) finds in another
empirical analysis this is not the case. In this study, he constructs three indices to
represent music quality: one created from lists assembled by various music critics, one
created from certification-based sales data, and one created from radio airplay data.
Regressing index levels from periods prior to the arrival of Napster on post-Napster
levels, he finds no decline in music quality; in fact, in the case of the two usage-based
indices, recorded music quality seems to increase in the post-Napster period. This
finding is puzzling when comparing it to the trend of declining recorded music revenue
that this paper has been addressing. A possible explanation Waldfogel suggests is that
while some new technologies have reduced revenue, other new technologies have
reduced the cost of bringing new music to market. This is an element surprisingly absent
from the empirical literature. Waldfogel (2017) has recently begun the foray into
examinations of digitization on the costs of creating copyright-protected media with a
qualitative analysis that suggests on balance, digitization has increased the number of
new entertainment products created and made available to consumers. Perhaps the cost
reductions are outweighing the revenue reductions well-documented in the empirical
literature so that on net, technological advancements are improving the welfare of not
only consumers but producers of often-pirated digital goods. However, there is a severe
lack of empirical support for this claim.
Overall the empirical literature, while still far from consensus, appears to suggest
that file sharing has a generally negative impact on aggregate recorded music industry
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sales and revenue. However, the effects become murkier when the analysis is narrowed
to the artist level. File sharing may help relatively unknown artists gain exposure via
network externalities and build fan bases via a word-of-mouth effect, while harming
popular artists who have well-established revenue bases. Additionally, the magnitude of
these effects varies widely between studies, with some claiming file sharing can explain
the entire decline in recorded music sales, and others claiming only a fraction of sales lost
can be attributed to the rise in online piracy. Variation in magnitude and direction is
likely a function of the distinct lack of detailed data regarding piracy and file sharing
which has led to the utilization of a wide variety of proxy variables, instruments, and
statistical methods that yield somewhat disparate results. Indeed, my own analysis falls
victim to this issue with estimated results of piracy, which will be discussed in the
following sections. Additionally, most empirical studies on the topic focus primarily on
sales or revenue. There is a distinct lack of analysis regarding digitization of music on
costs, which is a crucial component to measuring profitability and understanding the
broader welfare effects of file sharing, which is of ultimate interest. Unfortunately,
estimating changes in the cost of producing music over time is a challenge which I was
unable to include in this analysis.
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III.

Methodology and Data
In my analysis, I am primarily concerned with estimating the effects of

technological advancement and piracy on recorded music revenue. The desired
estimation equations take the following forms:
(1)

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑡 +
𝛽6 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡

(2)

𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑡 +
𝛽6 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡

(3)

𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑡 +
𝛽6 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡

Where TotRev signifies total recorded music revenue, PhysRev signifies revenue obtained
from physical mediums, and DigRev signifies revenue obtained from digital mediums. I
include as controls population and income. I assume that as population increases, more
individuals will consume music products, and as such must control for population trends
over time. I include income as a control because music purchases are likely correlated
with income levels. Since music is form of entertainment, I consider it a luxury good as
opposed to a necessary good. Economic theory suggests that a rise in income will lead to
an increase in the consumption of goods and an increase in the consumption of luxury
goods proportional to necessary goods (Varian 1992). Further, I assume that luxury
goods will be purchased with income that is spent at the consumer’s discretion, after
required expenditures such as income taxes. Thus, I determine disposable income per
capita as the most accurate measure of consumer income as it relates to purchases of
recorded music. A time trend is included to avoid the possibility of a spurious regression.
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I am concerned primarily with two items: how technological advancement and the
existence of piracy and file-sharing technologies have impacted revenue earned in the
aggregate recording music market, represented in the desired estimation equations by 𝛽5
and 𝛽6 . My hypotheses take the following form:

H1: Technological advancement has contributed to declining revenue in
the recorded music industry.

H2: Piracy and file sharing have contributed to declining revenue in the
recorded music industry.

I hypothesize that technological advancement has facilitated an increase in the
supply of recorded music. Without a corresponding increase of equal magnitude in
demand for recorded music, this supply shift will drive the price of music down and thus
revenues obtained in the industry. I believe the fact that technology has allowed music to
become more widely available from a more diverse set of sources has allowed more
musicians who previously would not have a platform to release recorded music.
Additionally, I believe the ease with which music can be uploaded and shared on the
Internet compared to previous time periods incentivizes musicians to release more
recorded music. Thus, I predict these effects have increased the supply of music, an
effect that will drive revenue down. This will be observable in the empirical analysis by
satisfying the following condition:
𝛽6 < 0
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I hypothesize that piracy and file sharing boasts a large substitution effect with
legitimate recorded music that dominates any positive demand-side effects. As
mentioned in Section 2, the literature documents three major impacts of piracy on music
sales: the sampling effect, network effects, and the substitution effect (Liebowitz 2005,
2006; Gopal et al. 2006; Peitz & Waelbrock 2004; Hui & Png 2003; Lee 2018). The
sampling effect and network effect state that piracy may impact music revenue by
increasing demand for legitimate music goods. The substitution effect states that pirated
music products are direct substitutes of legitimate music products and as such, an
increase in the availability of pirated music products will decrease demand for legitimate
music products. I hypothesize that while the sampling effect and network externalities
may have positive impacts on demand for recorded music, especially for artists with low
popularity levels, the substitution effect dominates in magnitude and as such, I should
observe the following condition in the empirical analysis:
𝛽5 < 0
Technological advancement is generally a difficult variable to define and measure
in economics due to the lack of concrete metrics and the broad scope of what could be
considered technological advancement; for the purpose of this analysis I develop a proxy
for technological advancement which consists of several variables signifying major
technological improvements in music accessibility throughout the time span of the
revenue data: the Sony Walkman player, the portable MP3 player, the Apple iPod,
personal computers (PCs), and smartphones. For PCs and smartphones, I use global unit
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sales from 1994 to 2016 and 2007 to 2016, respectively1. Specific unit sales for
Walkman players, MP3 players, and iPods were not available due to data limitations and
as such, dummy variables were assigned.
The three inventions of the Walkman player, MP3 player, and Apple iPod each
increased the ease of accessing and listening to music in a mobile fashion, which allowed
further consumption of music mediums while exercising or traveling. Personal
computers ushered in the era of digital music distribution through online platforms such
as Pandora Radio and iTunes. More recently, personal computers, in tandem with
smartphones, have supported the rise of music streaming platforms—such as Spotify and
Apple Music—that proliferate the market for recorded music today. Smartphones
compounded on mobile music accessibility innovations, allowing consumers to carry just
one device to access all their personal technology needs—including music, with
applications for all major streaming and video services readily available for download.
The development of the Apple iPhone was specifically noteworthy, as the synergies
created between the iPod, iPhone, and Apple’s digital music distribution service of
iTunes which ran on personal computers allowed seamless integration of music across
multiple platforms, an advancement that made widespread consumption of music easier
than ever before.
Piracy, or the unauthorized copying of legal music files for personal consumption
or redistribution, is an illegal activity and thus is difficult to obtain accurate data on or
measurements of. In my circumstances, individual file-sharing network data was not

1

Obtained from Gartner. Available PC and smartphone data are global figures while all revenue,
population, and income data are domestic figures. This provides a potential source of random measurement
error.
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available, nor were aggregate figures on Internet music file downloading or other copying
technologies. To remedy this deficiency, I develop a proxy that consist of four dummy
variables representing four landmarks in piracy and file-sharing technology: the CD
burner, the online peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing sites Napster (1999-2001) and
LimeWire (2000-2010), and the online BitTorrent index The Pirate Bay (2003-present).
The CD burner is a device that allows the copying of the contents of one CD onto
a blank CD. The advent of the CD in 1982 heralded a new era not just for the recorded
music industry, but for music pirates as the technology enabled master-quality copying in
large quantities via tools such as CD burners and encoding of MP3 files. With burners, a
legitimate music CD could easily be copied onto a pressed copy or a CD-Recordable disc
(CD-R) for personal use or more widely, distribution to the market for music.
Additionally, many personal computers came equipped with CD-ripping software and
CD burners built into the hardware around the turn of the 21st century (Janssens et al.
2009). Today, the RIAA permits copying of CDs for strictly personal use, as royalties
have already been paid on legitimately purchased CDs, but distribution of those copies
can be considered copyright infringement (2019). As such, I felt it would be important to
include as a precursor to the era of digital file-sharing networks and to identify if there
were noticeable impacts of piracy before the emergence of such networks.
In 1999, Napster was launched by Shawn Fanning with the intent of allowing
music files to be shared among strangers (Liebowitz 2006). It was the first online P2P
network that specialized in the sharing of MP3 files of music. P2P file sharing networks
allow users (peers) to use a software program that locates similar computers in the
network that carry the file desired and downloads it to a peer’s local computer. Once
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obtained, that computer can now be used by other peers in the network as a source for the
file (Carmack 2005). Within two short years, Napster faced litigation charges from
several record labels that are members of the RIAA, supported by separate lawsuits from
metal band Metallica and rapper and producer Dr. Dre, that ultimately ended the site’s
primary business model of trading copyrighted material through P2P file sharing (A&M
Records v. Napster, 2001). However, Napster had ushered in the advent of P2P file
sharing networks focused on music files that rapidly diffused across the Internet.
LimeWire was one of the first offshoot P2P clients that existed until 2010, when it
was forced to cease operations following a federal injunction (Arista Records LLC v.
Lime Group LLC, 2010). I believe LimeWire, as one of the earliest entrants to the filesharing market following Napster and longest-standing among the early entrants, was
significant to the widespread proliferation of file-sharing networks and as such, include it
as a variable in the model.
The final piracy dummy variable represents The Pirate Bay, a decentralized index
of torrent files which supports a regime of P2P file sharing known as BitTorrent.
BitTorrent is a communication protocol for P2P file sharing that has become the single
most common protocol on which peers transfer large files such as music. BitTorrent
functions similarly to P2P file sharing, however this protocol sources different pieces of
the file simultaneously from multiple computers in the network. Additionally, BitTorrent
uses a principal known as tit-for-tat. The tit-for-tat principal states that to receive files, a
peer must contribute files to the network, and the more files shared by a peer, the faster
that peer’s download speed is (Carmack 2005). In 2013, BitTorrent was responsible for
3.35% of worldwide bandwidth, which was more than half of the 6% total worldwide

30

bandwidth occupied by file sharing at the time (Palo Alto Networks). The Pirate Bay has
endured litigation and domain seizure, yet the file-sharing site survives through proxy
servers (Gibbs 2014; Van der Sar 2012, 2015). A proxy server (proxy) is a computer
system or application that acts as an intermediary between clients in a computer network
(Luotonen & Altis, 1994). Proxies offer a wide range of Internet-based functionalities,
one of which is acting as a relay between replicated Pirate Bay sites and the main server.
This functionality has allowed the index to survive sustained legal pressure, and it still
exists today with a large network of peers and digital files. Because of The Pirate Bay’s
network size and resilience, I have chosen it as a variable to represent the current regime
of file-sharing networks.
Substituting the developed proxy variables into my desired estimation equations, I
arrive at three equations to be estimated with the available data:
(1)

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑁𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 +
𝛽6 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑀𝑃3𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝑃𝐶𝑡 +
𝛽12 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡

(2)

𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑡 +
𝛽6 𝑁𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑀𝑃3𝑡 +
𝛽11 𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝑃𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡
𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑡 +

(3)
𝛽6 𝑁𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑀𝑃3𝑡 +
𝛽11 𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝑃𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡

Where each 𝛽 is estimated at time t for each variable. In addition to the data collected to
proxy for piracy and technological advancement, I use annual data on recorded music
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revenue for the years spanning 1973 to 2016, obtained from the RIAA. These numbers
are adjusted for inflation, measured in 2016 dollars.2 I include as controls U.S.
population and disposable income per capita3 from the same period, with disposable
income inflation-adjusted to 2016 dollars.
The key estimators of interest in the above equations are the coefficients on the
piracy proxy variables and the technological advancement proxy variables. Estimation of
equation (1) will provide insight on aggregate effects of piracy and technological
advancement. Estimation of equations (2) and (3) will provide insight on the effects of
substitution between physical and digital mediums and the effects of piracy and
technological advancement on each medium, permitting a more granular analysis.
Summary statistics for all variables are included in Table 3.1 below. Graphical visuals of
non-dummy variables are included in Appendix A.

2

I use the Consumer Price Index for all inflation calculations.

3

Both obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve. Per capita calculations are my own.
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Table 3.1
Summary Statistics

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Min

Max

TotRev

Description
Total real revenue in the
U.S. recorded music
industry (millions of U.S.
dollars)

12884.42

4168.67

6955.44

21010.98

DigRev

Real revenue generated by
digital mediums (millions
of U.S. dollars)

1281.89

1844.23

0

6042.69

11602.53

5365.56

1607.86

20468.3

33784.42

5617.41

25689.75 43229.31

265.91

34.88

211.91

323.13

109.16

129.74

0

365.4

159.48

388

0

1495.959

0.84

0.37

0

1

0.45

0.5

0

1

0.36

0.49

0

1

0.5

0.51

0

1

0.09

0.29

0

1

0.25

0.44

0

1

0.32

0.47

0

1

Income

Real revenue generated by
physical mediums
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Real U.S. disposable
income per capita (U.S.
dollars)

Pop

U.S. Population (millions)

PhysRev

PC

Smartphone

Walkman

MP3
iPod
Burner
Napster
LimeWire
PirateBay

Global unit sales of
personal computers
(millions, 1994-2016)
Global unit sales of
smartphones (millions,
2007-2016)
Dummy variable for
existence of Sony
Walkman player
Dummy variable for
existence of portable MP3
player
Dummy variable for
existence of Apple iPod
Dummy variable for
existence of CD burner
Dummy variable for
existence of Napster
Dummy variable for
existence of LimeWire
Dummy variable for
existence of The Pirate Bay
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IV.

Results
Table 4.1 displays the results of ordinary least squares regression of equation (1)

in column (1). Upon testing for heteroskedasticity, an F-statistic of 2.22 was returned
with a p-value of 0.037, indicating heteroskedasticity at the 5% level. As such, equation
(1) was estimated with robust errors, which is included in column (2). Using the AR(1)
model, no serial correlation was found. However, a RESET test indicated slight
misspecification at the 5% level, with ŷ2 returning a p-value of 0.048 and ŷ3 returning a pvalue of 0.045. Attempts to fix model misspecification by logging variables were
unsuccessful, thus misspecification may be a result of observed heteroskedasticity [in
which case, then should not be an issue by using robust errors as done in specification
(2)] or a result of omitted variable bias.
Specifications (1) and (2) confirm my H1: all technological advancement proxy
variables have strong negative coefficients and are all statistically significant at the 5%
level besides MP3. For example, an increase of one million PCs sold is associated with a
decrease of $64.7 million in total recorded music revenue, ceteris paribus. Robust errors
yield similar statistical significance results, with MP3 now significant at the 10% level.
Specifications (1) and (2) failed to confirm my H2: the piracy proxy variables
returned ambiguous coefficients. While Limewire returned a negative coefficient as
hypothesized, Burner, Napster, and PirateBay returned positive coefficients of varying
degrees of magnitude. Additionally, none of the estimators were significant at the 5%
except for Limewire when estimated with robust errors.
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Table 4.1
Effects on Total Recorded Music Revenue
Variables

(1)
(2)
.452
.452
Income
(.3217)
(.238)*
1,154.157
1,154.157
Pop
(289.463)***
(448.189)**
-2,408.229
-2,408.229
Time
(778.594)*** (1102.079)**
1,855.422
1,855.422
Burner
(1313.563)
(2150.146)
1,328.087
1,328.087
Napster
(1438.488)
(852.472)
-2,097.771
-2,097.771
Limewire
(1145.527)*
(661.497)***
131.611
131.611
PirateBay
(2131.534)
(1695.306)
-3,669.495
-3,669.495
Walkman
(1320.393)*** (1565.072)**
-1,806.526
-1,806.526
MP3
(1292.889)
(897.798)*
-3,548.99
-3,548.99
iPod
(1341.327)** (1211.395)***
-64.736
-64.736
PC
(7.800)***
(6.658)***
-7.878
-7.878
Smartphone
(1.152)***
(.867)***
4,506,851
4,506,851
Constant
(1472257)*** (2077704)**
R2

.9393

.94

F-stat

39.97

194.47

n

44

44

(*) ρ < 0.1
(**) ρ < 0.05
(***) ρ < 0.01
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Estimation of equation (2) using ordinary least squares resulted in a model that
was heteroskedastic at the 1% level with a F-statistic of 4.26 and mis-specified through
the RESET test at the 1% level, with ŷ2 returning a F-statistic of 4.44 and ŷ3 returning a
F-statistic of -4.10. As such, I will not discuss this model, though it is included in
Appendix B. Indeed, some of the estimators are interesting; however statistical tests are
unreliable, and the model is of dubious functional form.
Table 4.2 displays the results of ordinary least squares regression of equation (3).
This specification was not heteroskedastic, was not serially correlated, and maintained
functional specification at the 5% level by the RESET test. As in specifications (1) and
(2) in Table 4.1, the technological advancement proxy variables carried consistently
negative estimators that are all significant at the 1% level, besides MP3. For example, a
one-million-unit increase in smartphones sold is associated with a decrease of $5.79
million in recorded music revenue generated through sales of physical mediums, holding
all else constant including recorded music revenue generated by digital mediums. This
DigRev control indicates that these technological advancements are not just causing
consumers to substitute music purchases towards digital mediums, which could be
inferred from Table 4.1, and instead directly associated with declining revenue.
Additionally, the coefficient on DigRev is interesting: an increase of $1 million in
revenue generated by digital mediums is associated with a decrease of $2.1 million in
revenue generated by physical mediums, ceteris paribus. This suggests a
disproportionate effect in the substitution to digital mediums away from physical
mediums and could suggest the price of digital mediums is lower.
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Table 4.2
Effect on Recorded Music Revenue Generated by Physical Mediums
Variables

(3)
-2.100
DigRev
(.615)***
.600
Income
(.322)*
1,204.107
Pop
(281.078)***
-2,575.356
Time
(758.077)***
990.492
Burner
(1358.073)
225.038
Napster
(1520.388)
-1,804.61
Limewire
(1118.9)
-685.811
PirateBay
(2109.58)
-3,495.734
Walkman
(1279.498)***
-1,987.967
MP3
(1253.341)
-3,934.362
iPod
(1313.796)***
-50.664
PC
(10.891)***
-5.792
Smartphone
(1.612)***
4,822,259
Constant
(1433418)***
R2

.9669

F-stat
n

67.39
44

(*) ρ < 0.1
(**) ρ < 0.05
(***) ρ < 0.01
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Indeed, if the price of a digital unit of music is lower than the price of a physical unit of
music, the substitution of a digital unit of music for a physical unit of music would have a
net negative effect, as the revenue lost from the foregone purchase of the physical
medium would outweigh the revenue gained from the purchase of the digital medium.
The coefficient on DigRev suggests that, on aggregate, an increase in revenue from
digital products is associated to a disproportionate decrease in revenue for physical
products. This finding seems to confirm the tertiary hypothesis that the price of a unit of
music from a digital medium is less than the price of a unit of music from a physical
medium and is contributing towards downward pressure on overall recorded music
revenue.
Table 4.2 also displays ambiguous results of piracy on recorded music sales, as
observable in Table 4.1. While Limewire and PirateBay return negative coefficients,
Burner and Napster return positive coefficients, and none of the estimators are
statistically significant. It may be the case in both Tables 4.1 and 4.2 that PC is picking
up some omitted variable bias attributable to piracy. The estimator on PC may include
effects associated with piracy, as the increase in availability of piracy technology via filesharing networks is directly correlated with the rising ubiquity of personal computers in
the American household, and the selected piracy proxies may not be adequately
controlling for piracy effects due to the loose fit of the dummy variables. However, this
is not an observable phenomenon in this analysis and I find no strongly supported
empirical evidence to confirm my H2 that piracy is associated with declining recorded
music revenue.
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V.

Conclusion
Through the empirical analysis presented in this paper, I can confirm the

hypothesis that technological advancement has contributed to declining revenue in the
music industry, but I cannot confirm the hypothesis that piracy has contributed to
declining revenue. My empirical analysis suggests the presence of prominent copying
technologies and file-sharing networks has had an ambiguous and potentially negligible
effect on recorded music revenue. This finding can be contrasted with the literature
review conducted, which largely suggests that piracy has negative effects on aggregate
revenue in the music industry. However, as there are complicating effects when
examining the industry at the artist level—some artists may benefit from piracy
dependent on their status and popularity, while others are harmed—piracy effects seem to
differ dependent on the scope of the analysis. Additionally, magnitudes of estimated
impacts have a broad spread, making it difficult to estimate a true monetary loss to
piracy. The disparity in magnitudes raises questions about the validity of piracy studies
conducted by the recorded music industry. Another issue is the distinct lack of empirical
analysis of the impact of digitization and file sharing on the costs of producing and
distributing music—this consideration is essential to understand how digitization has
affected profitability and welfare. The rise of digital distribution has complicated the
narrative, especially considering the meteoric rise of streaming platforms that offer
unlimited access to a massive base of music for relatively low monthly subscription fees
such as Apple Music or Spotify. These services may prove to disrupt file sharing much
more than previous digital distribution mediums such as iTunes; however, this is an
untouched topic in the empirical literature so far. In conclusion, while the existing
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literature can make somewhat consistent causal inferences regarding the general welfare
of consumers and musicians under increased music piracy, the data currently available is
likely not detailed enough to make an accurate causal inference regarding the impact of
broader technological advancement on the welfare of musicians through the lens of
profitability and producer surplus. Thus, to assemble an accurate picture of the effect
technological advancement and the rise of digital distribution have had on the broader
welfare of musicians, the age-old adage holds—further research is required.
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APPENDIX A
Graphical Representation of Data 1973-2016
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APPENDIX B
Table B.1
Effects on Digital Recorded Music Revenue
Variables

(2)
-.133
PhysRev
(.039)***
.177
Income
(.079)**
193.343
Pop
(82.729)**
-452.977
Time
(209.091)**
-433.797
Burner
(336.135)
-691.739
Napster
(361.971)*
-48.956
Limewire
(293.868)
-626.373
PirateBay
(520.259)
-352.724
Walkman
(354.608)
-383.97
MP3
(321.341)
-777.11
iPod
(349.739)**
2.448
PC
(3.574)
.592
Smartphone
(.474)
849,798
Constant
(394614.7)**
R2

.9822

F-stat
n

127.30
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(*) ρ < 0.1
(**) ρ < 0.05
(***) ρ < 0.01
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